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Abstract 
A criterion of adequacy is proposed for theories of relevant consequence. According 
to the criterion, scientists whose deductive reasoning is limited to some proposed subset 
of the standard consequence relation must not thereby suffer a reduction in scientific 
competence. A simple theory of relevant consequence is introduced and shown to satisfy 
the criterion with respect to a formally defined paradigm of empirical inquiry. 
1 Introduction 
Deductive implication in a first-order framework has been the pivotal concept in at least 
two attempts to analyze aspects of scientific reasoning. On the one hand, the inductive 
confirmation of a given theory has been linked to the empirical verification of its logical 
consequences (see Hempel, 1965). On the other hand, the idea that one theory is closer to 
the truth than another has been construed in terms of the theories' respective sets of true 
and false consequences (see Popper, 1959). It is well known that both analyses founder on 
the richness of the class of deductive consequences of a given theory. Thus, one consequence 
of the axiom A is A V S for arbitrary sentence S;  yet verification of S (hence of A V S )  need 
not confirm A. Similarly, Tichjr (1974) proved that given any two theories A, B, if A is false 
then either A has a false consequence not implied by B, or B has a true consequence not 
implied by A. It follows that no false theory is closer to the truth than any other theory in 
the sense intended by Popper. As observed by Schurz & Weingartner (1987), Tichjr's proof 
requires the same, valid inference from A to A V S. 
Now this latter inference has an odd character inasmuch as it does not depend on any 
particular relation between A and S. In this sense, the form of S is "irrelevant" to the 
deduction. Thus is born the idea that by considering only the relevant consequences of a 
theory it may be possible to resurrect the two analyses of scientific reasoning cited above. 
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Such is the programme defended and elaborated by Weingartner and Schurz (Weingartner, 
1988; Weingartner & Schurz, 1986; Schurz & Weingartner, 1987). It is not the purpose of the 
present note to summarize the substantial results achieved by these investigators. Rather, 
we wish to suggest and illustrate a convergent criterion of adequacy for proposed definitions 
of relevant consequence, namely: 
(1) CRITERION: Scientists whose deductive reasoning is limited to some proposed subset 
of the standard consequence relation must not thereby suffer a reduction in scientific 
competence (compared to scientists not so limited in the deductions they draw). 
The justification of (1) should be apparent. An illuminating analysis of scientific practice 
cannot rest upon a system of reasoning that - if actually employed by scientists - would 
cleny them empirical insights otherwise attainable. 
Criterion (1) can be applied to a definition of relevant consequence only in the presence of 
a precise conception of scientific practice and scientific success. Such a conception amounts 
to formally specifying a paradigm of empirical inquiry. Many paradigms have been advanced 
and analyzed in recent years, mainly in the context of theoretical studies of machine learning 
and inductive inference (see Rivest, Haussler & Warmuth, 1989; Case & Fulk, 1990; and 
references cited there). For purposes of illustration we shall focus on the simplest paradigm 
that seems to preserve essential ingredients of scientific reasoning in a first-order framework; 
it was first introduced in Osherson, Stob & Weinstein (1991a). Similarly, our illustration 
bears on an elementary conception of relevant consecluence. This conception will be shown 
to satisfy Criterion (1) with respect to the paradigm we describe. 
Our exposition is organized as follows. A definition of relevant consequence is provided 
in the next section. Section 3 introduces a paradigm of empirical inquiry that frames the 
remaining analysis. In Section 4 we define a (formal) scientist who reasons in a relevant 
manner and whose scientific competence is demonstrably maximal. Concluding remarks 
occupy Section 5. 
For the sequel we fix a countable, first-order language L with identity. The set of L- 
formulas and L-sentences are denoted by &form and L,,,, respectively. Unless otherwise 
noted, structures (or "models") are assumed to interpret L. By "predicate" we mean a 
predicate letter other than =. We rely on the standard account of consequence for open 
formulas, namely: Given sets I', C of formulas, we write I' C just in case for all structures 
S and assignments g to S, if S + r[g] then S + C[g]. 
2 Relevant consequence 
The following definition is based on ideas that may be attributed to Korner (1959, 1979) 
(cited in Weingartner, 1988). As a preliminary, for each arity n 2 0 we fix an n-ary predicate 
Qn that does not occur in L. Given 8 E Lfo, and n-ary predicate R, the result of uniformly 
replacing every occurrence of R in 8 by Q" is denoted 8[R I Qn]. 
(2) DEFINITION: Let J? C Lform and 8 E Lfom be given. I' implies 8 relevantly just in 
case: 
(b) there is no wary predicate symbol R occurring in 0 such that r k B[R I Qn]. 
In this case we write I?+,$; otherwise I'FrO. If (a) is true but (b) false, then r implies 
0 irrelevantly. 
(a) Suppose that r = { V x ~ F x )  and 0 = Vx(Fx + Gx). Then r 0 but rFrO. 
This is because r k 0[G I Q1], i.e., I? k Vx(Fx + Q1x). 
(b) For every A, S E Lf,, if A and S share no predicates then AFrA V S. 
(c) {Vx(Fx V G x ) , V X ~ F X ) ~ ~ V X G X .  
(d) F a  A Gbk,(Fa A Gb) V F b .  
Examples (a) and (b) suggest that valid inferences labelled irrelevant by Definition (2) are 
defective from the point of view of empirical inquiry. Thus, a scientist who wishes to determine 
the truth of Vx lFx  would not normally attempt to verify Vx(Fx + Gx); similarly for A 
and A V S. In contrast, the relevant inference of Example (c) seems to represent legitimate 
scientific practice; determining the truth of {Vx(Fx V G x ) , V x ~ F x )  might well involve an 
attempt to verify VxGx. 
Example (d) shows that Definition (2) does not, however, cover all cases of irrelevant infer- 
ence. The definition may be strengthened to label (d) irrelevant (as in Schurz & Weingartner, 
1987). We shall nonetheless maintain the present version since it facilitates illustration of 
Criterion (1). 
We note that b, is not proposed as a new analysis of validity, alternative to +. To the 
contrary, we assume that in a first-order context, the (standard) consequences of a theory T 
exhaust the set of sentences whose truth is guaranteed by that of T. Relevant consequence 
should rather be construed as a model of the deductive component of scientific reasoning. 
As such, kr cannot be expected to possess all the pleasing properties of k (monotonicity, 
deduction theorem, etc.). In fact, contrary to standard consequence, we have the following. 
(4) PROPOSITION: Suppose that L contains one 2-ary predicate and the 0-ary predicate 
P. Then the subset X = {(a, P) I abrP) of pairs of L-formulas is not effectively 
enumerable. 
Proof: If X were effectively enumerable, then (contrary to fact) so would be the set of 
iloncontradictions in the sublanguage L' of L without P. For, 6' E L' is noncontradictory iff 
P A  8+,P. H 
Finally, it will be convenient at this juncture to consider a kind of irrelevance that can 
infect individual sentences. Let 0 = 3x(Gx A ( F x  V ~ F x ) ) ,  and suppose that structure 
S satisfies 0 .  Then every expansion St  of S to Q1 satisfies 6[F I Q1]. The predicate F 
thus appears "inessentially" in 0, and scientific reasoning about O is bound to have an odd 
character. The following definition allows us to exclude such cases from our discussion of 
empirical inquiry. 
(5) DEFINITION: Let 0 E Lfom be given. 8 is normal just in case for every structure S 
and every n-ary predicate F appearing in 8, if S 0 then some expansion of S to Qn 
satisfies lO[F I Qn]. 
3 A paradigm of empirical inquiry 
The present section introduces a formal paradigm of empirical inquiry. 
3.1 Overview 
Our fixed language ,C is assumed to be suitable for expressing scientific data and theories 
within some given field of inquiry. Prior research in the field is conceived as verifying a set 
T c ,C of axioms already known to be true. Each structure satisfying T thus represents a 
possible world consistent with background knowledge. For simplicity, attention is limited to 
countable structures; "structure" and related expressions should henceforth be understood in 
this sense. We assume that Nature has chosen some (countable) model S of T to be actual; 
lier choice is unknown to us. 
A given scientist .JI is conceived as attempting to divine the truth-value in S of some 
specific sentence 0 that is not decided by T. At the start of inquiry the deductive consequences 
of T exhaust .J17s knowledge of S .  As inquiry proceeds, the following kind of information 
becomes available to $. It is assumed that .JI is able to determine, for each atomic formula 
4 2 )  of L and any ii E IS[ whether or not Si satisfies cp(2) in S. .JI receives all of IS/ in 
piecemeal fashion and bases its conjecture at a given moment on the finite subset of JSI 
examined by that time. Upon receiving each new datum, $ emits a fresh conjecture about 
the truth of 0 in S, announcing either "true" or "false." To be counted as successful, $'s 
successive conjectures must stabilize to "true" if S 8 and to "false" otherwise. 
Further motivating remarks may be found in Osherson & Weinstein (1989). We turn now 
to the definitions that formalize the paradigm. 
3.2 Definitions 
cp E Lf,,, is called "basic" just in case cp is an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic 
formula. The basic subset of ,Cform is denoted BAS. In the context of an assignment of 
variables to the unknown structure S, members of BAS may be conceived as encoding facts 
of the form a E pS or Si fC PS, for predicate P E L, as suggested in the overview. The set of 
all finite sequences over BAS is denoted SEQ. Given a E SEQ, the set of formulas appearing 
in a is denoted by range(a). Members of SEQ of length n may be conceived as potential 
"evidential positions" of a scientist at moment n of his inquiry. By a complete assignment to 
a structure S is meant a mapping of the variables of C onto ISI. Given T C LCsen, the class 
of all (countable) models of T is denoted MOD(T). 
We now consider the information available to a scientist working in an unknown structure. 
An environment is any w-sequence over BAS. Given an environment e, the set of formulas 
appearing in e is denoted by range(e) and the initial finite sequence of length n in e is 
denoted en. The following definition specifies the sense in which an environment can provide 
information about a structure. 
(6) DEFINITION: Let environment e ,  structure S, and assignment g  to S be given. e is 
for S via g just in case range(e) = { p  E BAS I S p [g ] ) .  
Thus, when g  is complete, an environment e for S via g  provides basic information about 
every element of IS\, using variables as codes for elements. It is easy to see that structures 
sharing an environment are isomorphic. 
We take a scientist to be any function (partial or total) from SEQ to {t, f ) .  A scientist 
may be conceived as a special purpose device devoted to discovering the truth-value of a 
single sentence 6. Given input data a E SEQ, the scientist conjectures a truth-value for 0 in 
whatever structure S has given rise to a. To be successful on 6 in S, $ must "detect" the 
truth-value of 6 in S, as specified by the following definition. 
(7) DEFINITION: Let 6 E L,,,, structure S and scientist $ be given. $ detects 6 in S just 
in case for every complete assignment g  to S, and every environment e for S via g,  if 
S 6 then $(en)  = t for cofinitely many n E N, and if S + 16 then $(en) = f for 
cofinit ely many n E N. 
Thus, we credit 4 with detecting 6 in S just in case $'s successive conjectures about the truth- 
value of 6 in S eventually stabilize to the correct one in response to increasingly complete 
information about S. 
(S) DEFINITION: Let class K of structures, 6 E Lsen and scientist $ be given. $ detects 6' 
in /i: just in case for all S E K, $ detects 6 in S .  In this case 6 is detectable in IC. 
Pursuant to the conception of scientific inquiry described in the overview, we shall be 
particularly concerned with detectability in elementary classes of structures. Given 6 E L,,, 
and T C_ C,,, we ask whether 6 is detectable in MOD(T). Examples of detectability and 
nondetectability in the foregoing sense are provided in Osherson, Stob & Weinstein (1991a). 
The following theorem is also proved there. 
(9) TIIEOREM: Let 6 E C,,, and T C L,,, be given. 6 is detectable in MOD(T) iff both 
6 and 1 0  are equivalent over T to existential-universal sentences. 
In the sequel we shall consider general-purpose scientists who are parameterized by a 
background theory T and target sentence 8. Formally, such a scientist Q is a function with 
range { t ,  f )  and defined in the set of triples of form (T, 0, a) ,  where T C_ L,,,, 6 E L,,,, and 
n E SEQ. !D may be thought of as converting arbitrary T and 0 into a scientist Xa.Q(T, 0, a )  
to be evaluated for its ability to detect 0 in MOD(T). 
4 A scientific method based on relevant consequence 
In the present section we define a general-purpose scientist Q with the following properties. 
(10) (a) 9 embodies a method of inquiry that rests squarely on relevant consequence, 
with no role for irrelevant consequence. 
(b) Q enjoys maximal scientific competence in the following sense. 9 can detect any 
normal sentence in the models of any given theory, provided only that this is 
possible in principle. 
We take the existence of such a 9 to demonstrate that scientists who reason in conformity 
with Definition (2) of relevant consequence need suffer thereby no reduction in scientific 
competence - at least, not within the framework of the present paradigm of empirical inquiry. 
In this sense, Definition (2) satisifes Criterion (1). 
Towards the specification of Q we fix an enumeration II = {aj 1 j 2 0) of all universal 
formulas in .&-. The following definitions will also be helpful. 
(11) DEFINITION: Let aj E II and a E SEQ be given. a cancels aj just in case there is 
p E BAS such that: 
(12) DEFINITION: The functions TRUE(.) and FALSE(.) are defined as follows. Let T C_ 
.Csen, 19 E L,,,, and a E SEQ be given. TRUE(T, 6, a) is the least j 2 0 such that: 
(a) a does not cancel aj; 
(b) there is o E LSen with T U {aj)/=,a A 8 and o A O/=,O. 
If no such j exists, TRUE(T,Q,c) = w. FALSE(T, 6, a )  is the least j 2 0 such that: 
(a) a does not cancel aj; 
(b) there is o E Lsen with T U {aj)\,a A 1 8  and cr A 18br16.  
If no such j exists, FALSE(T, 8, a) = w. 
Finally, given T 5 Lsen and a E SEQ, define Q(T, 6, a) = 
if TRUE(T, 8, a )  < FALSE(T, 6, a )  
if FA4LSE(T, 8, a )  < TRUE(T, 6, a )  
undefined otherwise. 
That 9 satisfies (10)b is shown by the following. 
(13) THEOREM: Let T 2 Lse, and normal 0 E L,,, be given. If 0 is detectable in MOD(T) 
then Xa.Q(T, 0, a )  detects 8 in MOD(T). 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Regarding (10)a, it is clear that the core of Q's reasoning rests on two kinds of relevant 
deduction: one from T U {r j }  to a A f 9, the other from a A f 9 to 433. To see that the 
combination of such steps is not a disguised form of standard consequence, it suffices to note 
the following. There exist A, B E .Cform such that (a) A + B, but (b) there is no C E .Cfom 
with A+,C A B and C A BkrB. An example is A = Fa,  B = F a  V Gb. We conclude that Q 
satisfies (10)a. 
Concluding remarks 
Although Definition (2) meets Criterion (I) ,  we saw that it does not correctly label all cases 
of irrelevant deduction. The definition thus cannot serve to rehabilitate the idea that verified 
consequences of a theory are confirmatory (and similarly for verisimilitude). Alternative 
conceptions of relevant consequence must therefore be considered, for example, those reviewed 
in \ireingarten (1988).' Within the perspective of the present paper, each such conception 
may be evaluated from two points of view. On the one hand, it should help make sense of 
confirmation, verisimilitude, and other aspects of empirical inquiry. On other hand, it should 
llclp explain why scieiltific reasoning sometimes succeeds, by serving as the sole deductive 
resource in a successful method of inductive inference. 
Criterion (1) has here been interpreted in terms of a particular paradigm of empirical 
inquiry, but several other models would have served equally well (for alternative paraidigms, 
see Osherson, Stob & W'einstein, 1989, 1991b,c 1992). The most satisfying analysis would 
characterize the class of paradigms in which scientists who rely on relevant consequence have 
lllaxiinal competence. Achieving such a characterization will no doubt depend on progress in 
tlie theory of inductive inference and scientific discovery. 
Appendix: Proof of Theorem (13) 
Let T L,,,, normal 9 E L,,,, and S E MOD(T) be given, and suppose that 9 is detectable 
in MOD(T). (If MOD(T) = 8 nothing needs to be proved.) Suppose that S 0 (the case 
S ,L 1 9  is ~arallel) .  Let environment e for S via complete assignment g to S be given. We 
rilust show: 
(14) Q(T, 9, E,) = t for cofinitely many m > 0. 
Since S + 0, for every rj E II such that T U { r j )  /= 1 9  there is m > 0 such that Em cancels 
rj (because g maps the variables of C onto IS/). Consequently, by the definition of 9, (14) 
Iollows from: 
'In contrast, relevance logics within the tradition established by Anderson & Belnap (1975; Dunn, 1986) 
do not seem suited to the present context. Virtually all such logics allow the inference from A to A V  B, and 
rule out the inference from { A  V B ,  TB} to A. 
(15) There exists 7rj E I3 and a E L such that: 
(a) for all m 2 0, em does not cancel 7 r j ;  
(b) T U { r j )  kra A 0; 
(c) a A OkrO. 
By Theorem (9), let 7rk E II be such that: 
For each n-ary predicate F appearing in 0, let F = 
13ZFZ if S 13ZFZ 
otherwise. 
where in the latter case 3 is the lexicographically first set of n variables such that S t-= FZ[g]. 
Let ,f3 = A{B  I the predicate F appears in 0). ?Ve take a to be the existential closure 
of p. We take nj to be 7rk A P. It is easy to verify that nj f II. By (16)a it follows that n j  
satisfies (15)a, and that: 
(17) (a) S k njbl 
(b)  S k a A 0  
In view of (16)b we have: 
(18) (a) T U { r j }  a A 9 
(b) a A d  0 
Thus, it remains to show that the latter implications are relevant. 
For (18)a suppose that n-ary predicate F appears in 0 .  It is easy to see that some extension 
S' of S to Qn satisfies ~ ~ [ F I Q ~ ] .  By (17)a, S' k T U { 7 r j } .  However, S' (a A 0) [F  I Qn]. 
It follows that T U {7rj)b,a A 0. 
As for (18)b, let n-ary predicate F appear in 0. By Definition ( 5 )  and the normality of 
O there is an expansion S' of S to Qn such that S' 0[F I Q"]. By (17)b, S' i= a A 0. It 
follows that a A 8br0. 
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